There's a lengthy, interesting interview with Alexander Solzhenitsyn (yes, he's still alive!) in Der Spiegel; reading it--a German publication talking to a Russian about totalitarianism and its enduring stain--made me think how truly foreign the experiences of a Europe that grew up either directly under or in the shadow of first Nazism and then Communism can be to us.
His political views aren't what I expected, based on what I remember from reading the Gulag Archipelago and what I'd assume the leading anti-Communist dissident (along with Natan Sharansky) would think about post-Communist Russia.
His take on Vladimir Putin was particularly surprising:
Vladimir Putin -- yes, he was an officer of the intelligence services, but he was not a KGB investigator, nor was he the head of a camp in the gulag. As for service in foreign intelligence, that is not a negative in any country -- sometimes it even draws praise. George Bush Sr. was not much criticized for being the ex-head of the CIA, for example. ...
SPIEGEL: How do you assess the period of Putin's governance in comparison with his predecessors Yeltsin and Gorbachev?
Solzhenitsyn: Gorbachev's administration was amazingly politically naïve, inexperienced and irresponsible towards the country. It was not governance but a thoughtless renunciation of power. The admiration of the West in return only strengthened his conviction that his approach was right. But let us be clear that it was Gorbachev, and not Yeltsin, as is now widely being claimed, who first gave freedom of speech and movement to the citizens of our country.
Yeltsin's period was characterized by a no less irresponsible attitude to people's lives, but in other ways. In his haste to have private rather than state ownership as quickly as possible, Yeltsin started a mass, multi-billion-dollar fire sale of the national patrimony. Wanting to gain the support of regional leaders, Yeltsin called directly for separatism and passed laws that encouraged and empowered the collapse of the Russian state. This, of course, deprived Russia of its historical role for which it had worked so hard, and lowered its standing in the international community. All this met with even more hearty Western applause.
Putin inherited a ransacked and bewildered country, with a poor and demoralized people. And he started to do what was possible -- a slow and gradual restoration. These efforts were not noticed, nor appreciated, immediately. In any case, one is hard pressed to find examples in history when steps by one country to restore its strength were met favorably by other governments.
He's nuts! Gorbachev didn't renounce power--he renounced a sham by which the USSR, by starving its people via a permanent war-time footing, put forth the ultimate Potemkin village for seven decades.
It was a farce that could not last in the Information Age, that managed to hang on only when the state had a shot at controlling all lies and truths.
And Putin hasn't revived anything--it's been the monstrous jump in the price of oil that's dragged the Russian economy back from collapse; all Putin's done is set up a cult of personality dictatorship under the guise of nationalism.
I guess what we forget is that Solzhenitsyn was so anti-Communist in part because they enslaved what he saw as the greatest of all nations, of all people. For him, Russia's natural place is in front, which to me is ridiculous.
Aside from the steroid-like 'power' that the Communists projected, Russia after the devastating Mongol invasions of the 13th century has always been at least decades behind the West. Their tiny intellectual class has been fiercely productive, but the vast majority of the country has always been a brutish wasteland.
Look at the astonishing rates of alcoholism in Russia; and how it's about the only industrialized country that's suffered a decrease in life expectancy, currently standing at
59 years for males and 72 years for females.
That, and a startling decline in its birth rate (forcing the government to try
bribing women to have kids), adds up to a place that, if you took away their nuclear weapons, would be the definition of a Third World country.
But Solzhenitsyn being so Russian there is also this:
SPIEGEL: Your recent two-volume work "200 Years Together" was an attempt to overcome a taboo against discussing the common history of Russians and Jews. These two volumes have provoked mainly perplexity in the West. You say the Jews are the leading force of global capital and they are among the foremost destroyers of the bourgeoisie. Are we to conclude from your rich array of sources that the Jews carry more responsibility than others for the failed Soviet experiment?
Solzhenitsyn: I avoid exactly that which your question implies: I do not call for any sort of scorekeeping or comparisons between the moral responsibility of one people or another; moreover, I completely exclude the notion of responsibility of one nation towards another. All I am calling for is self-reflection.
You can get the answer to your question from the book itself: "Every people must answer morally for all of its past -- including that past which is shameful. Answer by what means? By attempting to comprehend: How could such a thing have been allowed? Where in all this is our error? And could it happen again? It is in that spirit, specifically, that it would behoove the Jewish people to answer, both for the revolutionary cutthroats and the ranks willing to serve them. Not to answer before other peoples, but to oneself, to one's consciousness, and before God. Just as we Russians must answer -- for the pogroms, for those merciless arsonist peasants, for those crazed revolutionary soldiers, for those savage sailors."
And then, there's this example of myopia:
SPIEGEL: But Russia often finds itself alone. Recently relations between Russia and the West have gotten somewhat colder (more...), and this includes Russian-European relations. What is the reason? What are the West's difficulties in understanding modern Russia?
Solzhenitsyn: I can name many reasons, but the most interesting ones are psychological, i.e. the clash of illusory hopes against reality. This happened both in Russia and in West. When I returned to Russia in 1994, the Western world and its states were practically being worshipped. Admittedly, this was caused not so much by real knowledge or a conscious choice, but by the natural disgust with the Bolshevik regime and its anti-Western propaganda.
This mood started changing with the cruel NATO bombings of Serbia. It's fair to say that all layers of Russian society were deeply and indelibly shocked by those bombings. The situation then became worse when NATO started to spread its influence and draw the ex-Soviet republics into its structure. This was especially painful in the case of Ukraine, a country whose closeness to Russia is defined by literally millions of family ties among our peoples, relatives living on different sides of the national border. At one fell stroke, these families could be torn apart by a new dividing line, the border of a military bloc.
So, the perception of the West as mostly a "knight of democracy" has been replaced with the disappointed belief that pragmatism, often cynical and selfish, lies at the core of Western policies. For many Russians it was a grave disillusion, a crushing of ideals.
At the same time the West was enjoying its victory after the exhausting Cold War, and observing the 15-year-long anarchy under Gorbachev and Yeltsin. In this context it was easy to get accustomed to the idea that Russia had become almost a Third World country and would remain so forever. When Russia started to regain some of its strength as an economy and as a state, the West's reaction -- perhaps a subconscious one, based on erstwhile fears -- was panic.
Anyone who calls the bombing of Serbia--a last-ditch and successful effort to stop ethnic cleansing via the slaughter of civilians by Slobodan Milosovic and his ilk--"cruel" is living in a fantasy world borne of some pretty deep-seated prejudices, perpetuated by delusions of grandeur and the daily slap of shame from reality.
That's really the legacy of the Communists--via the shortcut of five-year plans built on the hidden muscle of slave labor camps, they perpetuated a psychological fraud on the Russian people in making them think they had caught up with the West and could take their "rightful" place.
But what they've left behind is a deluded populace that not only can't catch up to Europe--but is in the process of being passed by Asia.
Which more than anything lends a sense of sadness to Solzhenitsyn's archaic beliefs, anchored in the false memories that Communism must have instilled even as he fought it:
But did not Russia clearly and unambiguously stretch its helping hand to the West after 9/11? Only a psychological shortcoming, or else a disastrous shortsightedness, can explain the West's irrational refusal of this hand. No sooner did the USA accept Russia's critically important aid in Afghanistan than it immediately started making newer and newer demands. As for Europe, its claims towards Russia are fairly transparently based on fears about energy, unjustified fears at that.
Isn't it a luxury for the West to be pushing Russia aside now, especially in the face of new threats? In my last Western interview before I returned to Russia (for Forbes magazine in April 1994) I said: "If we look far into the future, one can see a time in the 21st century when both Europe and the USA will be in dire need of Russia as an ally."
Ah, yes, Russia as an ally against Islamic fundamentalism--why no mention of Chechnya in your interview, Alexander Isayevich?
Friends like that we don't need.
Jurij Filistow photo of Solzhenitsyn in Der Spiegel